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Publication Date: 10/15/2003
Source: Maryland Daily Record
Copyright: 2003 The Daily Record
Author: Peter Geier
Court of Special Appeals nixes
prosecutors' bid to create new
The state violated a defendant's speedy-trial rights by
dismissing, then re-filing, the charges against him when prosecutors were unable
to obtain a continuance, the Court of Special Appeals has held.
The decision affirmed Montgomery County Circuit Judge Michael D. Mason's
dismissal of robbery and first- and second-degree assault charges against
Wilbert Pelzie Price on the grounds that the state had violated the 180-day
limit established by Hicks v. State.
Price was first indicted in May 2002, but the charges were nolle prossed when
the administrative judge denied a postponement because, according to the
opinion, the state had ordered the DNA tests too late and was unwilling to
proceed without the results. Price was reindicted four months later.
Steven D. Kupferberg, Price's trial lawyer, called it the most classic Hicks
case I've ever had.The previous decisions had taken all the teeth from Hicks,
Kupferberg said, and therefore gave the prosecutor the opportunity to
charge-dismiss, charge-dismiss unless it was absolutely clear that they were
dismissing to get around the Hicks rule - which for obvious reasons, they're
never going to admit.
However, in this case, the state's attempt to circumvent the 180- day rule was
so glaring and so obvious that then-Montgomery County Circuit Administrative
Judge Paul H. Weinstein, who denied the continuance, was just beside himself,
the lawyer said.
However, John McCarthy, deputy state's attorney for Montgomery County, said the
case is the only instance of which he was aware that no continuance was granted
to complete DNA testing.
We're troubled by the decision because of the realities of getting DNA testing
done, McCarthy said. What we had here was a prosecutor who was trying to do
thorough case preparation. Nothing could be further from the truth [than] that
there was an intention to circumvent the 180-day rule.
Everybody in the system knows there are delays - it's just the practical reality
of getting all the material together and tested by overworked, understaffed
units that must prioritize their work, he said.
If your case hinges on scientific evidence and that evidence is not ready, your
case is seriously flawed. The irony here, of course, is that there was
scientifically neutral information being developed that could have exonerated
this defendant, McCarthy said.
However, writing for the intermediate appellate court, Judge Arrie W. Davis
noted that the necessary effect of the nol pros was to circumvent the statutory
and rule time limits as well as the sanction that the State be prohibited from
introducing any witness or evidence at trial or hearing which relates in any way
to the nondisclosure for failure to comply with the motion to compel discovery.
The 180-day period under Hicks began at the time of the filing of the initial
indictment and the trial judge therefore did not err when he dismissed the case
on November 27, 2002 - day 194, Davis wrote.
Kathryn Grill Graeff, chief of the attorney general's criminal appeals division,
disagreed with the appellate panel's conclusion.
A substantial period of time remained between the dismissal and the expiration
of the Hicks period in the initial case, Graeff said, and in such circumstances,
the Hicks rule should start to run when the charges are refiled.
We will review the court's decision carefully to see if we'll seek further
review, she said.
Bradford C. Peabody, Price's appellate public defender, said he thought the
state's problem came down to miscommunication between the police, the prosecutor
and the lab.
Peabody said the case reminded him of Bill Murray's character in the film
Groundhog Day, made to repeat the same day over and over, trying to get it
right.
The prosecution kept telling the court the DNA testing was not done, but they
didn't tell the lab when they needed the results - a costly mistake, Peabody
said.
WHAT THE COURT HELD
Case:
State v. Price, CSA No. 2487, Sept. Term 2002. Reported. Opinion by Davis, J.
Filed Oct. 10, 2003.
Issue:
Did the trial court err in dismissing a second indictment when the state nolle
prossed the original charges because it could not try its case within the
180-day limit prescribed by State v. Hicks due to the unavailability of DNA test
results?
Holding:
No; affirmed. The nolle pros effectively circumvented statutory and rule
requirements, as well as the sanction barring the state from introducing
anything at trial or hearing related to a nondisclosure for failure to comply
with a motion to compel discovery. The Hicks period began when initial
indictment was filed, thus the trial court did not err when it dismissed the
case on day 194.
Counsel:
Asst. A.G. Mary Ann Ince for appellant; Asst. P.D. Bradford C. Peabody for
appellee.
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